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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes to adopt data envelopment analysis (DEA) based 
Malmquist total factor productivity (TFP) indices methods to evaluate the effect of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on acquirers in short-term and long-term window. 
Based on analyzing 32 M&A deals conducted by Chinese real estate firms from 
2000-2011, the study result demonstrate that the effect of M&A on developers’ 
performance is positive. Through M&A, the developers’ Malmquist TFP experienced 
a steady growth; their technology has got noticeable progress immediately after 
acquisition; and their technical efficiency has suffered a slight decrease in short-term 
after acquisition, but then achieved marked increase in the long-term when 
realization of integration and synergy. However, there is no evidence that the real 
estate firms have achieved scale efficiency improvement after M&A in either 
short-term or long-term.      
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INTRODUCTION 
Real estate is the fastest-growing industry since its formation and 
development in 1980’s following with the China’s policies of reform and opening up 
  
(Choi, 1998) Due to the Chinese government enacted a series of macro-economic 
regulatory policy to mitigate the risk of real estate bubble since 2004, the real estate 
industry is experiencing a wave of M&As to survival and remain competitive. And 
now real estate industry is one of the most active industries involved in the M&As 
activities in China. According to the record of Zdatabase, both of the deals number 
and volume of M&As transaction are increasing sharply since 2006. However, It is 
not clarity yet whether M&A strategy adopted by real estate industry is value 
enhancement or not. The purpose of this study is to identify whether M&As deals 
conducted by Chinese real estate developers make economic sense from the 
perspective of firm’s performance. 
In spite of various methods are proposed to evaluate the performance of the 
M&As in business domain, the commonly used methods include such three 
categories as event studies, cash flow analysis, and market value frontiers (Franks 
and Harris, 1989; Healy et al., 1992; Sudarsanam et al. ,1996; Mitchell et al. , 2004;).  
However, as Antoniou et al (2011) stated, these methods are inability to reflect the 
meaningful insight and usable information regarding the core question of whether 
M&As create value. Therefore, to overcome the failure of these commonly used 
methods and measure the reality value creation of M&As, this study adopts a Data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) based Malmquist total factor productivity (TFP) Index 
to analyze the effect of M&As on the performance of acquirers.  
DEA was originally established by Charnes et al (1978) based on the work of 
Farrell (1957), which is a powerful methodology for assessing the relative 
efficiencies of multi-input and multi-out production units. The major advantages of 
DEA over other methods like cost-benefit analysis or regression include that it no 
need to select a particular functional form, to establish a distributional assumption 
and to set up the relative weights of the variables, it is very convenient to detect the 
efficiency and productivity changes of each firm due to its result is individual firm 
based, and it has good statistical characters (Charnes et al, 1978; Cooper, et al, 2007).  
The Malmquist (1953) index was first adopted to analyze productivity by 
Caves et al. (1982). Since then, most of studies adopted the Malmquist index to 
evaluate the TFP change for a particular organization between two periods, s and t, 
although Malmquist index could be applied in other areas equally well (Färe et al 
1994; Cooper et al, 2007; Kortelainen, 2008). Malmquist indexes have several 
desirable features and properties over other indices, such as they no need to make 
behavioral assumptions like cost minimization or profit maximization, which make 
them useful when producer’s objectives differ, or are unknown or are unachieved; 
they no need to provide price information which make them practicable when either 
prices do not exist, distorted or have little economic meaning; and they can be easily 
calculated by the DEA methodology (Caves et al. 1982; Färe et al,1994). Therefore, 
DEA-based Malmquist TFP Index is appropriate to evaluate the firm’s performance 
change during M&A. 
  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains 
research methodology. Section 3 presents the research results of performance 
evaluation, and Section 4 concludes.         
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
Data sources and sample selection:  
The M&A deals are identified through Thomson Financial Securities Data's 
SDC and Bloomberg database. For Chinese real estate industry, specially, its M&A 
deal information can be complemented by (1) China Real Estate Industry Research 
Database, (2) China-listed Firm’s Merger & Acquisition Dataset. The sample of this 
study will be selected according to the following criteria. In line with M&A theories, 
an M&A deal completed where there must be a transfer of ownership between 
acquirers and targets, which means that M&A deals with pending, terminated, or 
non-binding, and acquisition of minority interest will be excluded from the sample. 
As to investigate the performance of real estate firms as acquirers, acquirers are 
required to belong to real estate industry while targets have no such limitation. 
Furthermore, data available is another primarily requirement for the sample 
selection, which means that only listed developers will be selected as their operation 
and financial data are public disclosure. Finally, 32 M&A cases in Chinese real estate 
industry are selected as sample for this study. 
Evaluation indicators 
To reflect the real estate industry’s operational characteristic, this study 
adopts the representative evaluation indicators following the study of Chiu and Wang 
(2011). Finally, eight indicators are selected in this study. There are three input 
indicators comprising stockholder’s equity ratio, Inventory turnover, and Receivable 
Turnover Ratio, and five output indicators including Return of equity, Return on 
sales, quick ratio, cash flow ratio, and return of assets. These indicators are 
summarized in Table 1. 
DEA-Based Malmquist analysis for productivity 
Malmquist index approach is adopted to measure the total factor productivity 
(TFP) change of Decision Making Unit (DMUs) over time in this study. The 
description below draws primarily upon the work of Fare et al (1994) and recaps 
some of the discussion from Coelli et al (2005). The Malmquist TFP change index 
(output-orientated) between period s (the start period) and period t can be calculated 
by (Caves et al ,1982):   
  
M0(xs, ys, xt, yt) = �D0s(xt, yt)D0s(xs, ys) × D0t (xt, yt)D0t (xs, ys)�1 2⁄  
(1) 
The distance function D0s(xs, ys) = inf{∅: (xs, ys ∅⁄ ) ∈ Ss}  is defined as 
reciprocal of the “maximum” proportional expansion of the output vector ys in given 
inputs xs. Similarly, the distance function D0s(xt, yt) = inf{∅: (xt, yt/∅) ∈ Ss} 
represents the distance from period t to the period s technology. If the value of M0 is 
larger than one, it means that the TFP growth from period s to period t, or else it 
indicates the TFP decline.  
Through rearranging the function 1, The TFP index can be decomposed into 
the product of the technical change index and the technical efficiency change index 
as： M0(xs, ys, xt, yt) = D0t (xt, yt)D0s(xs, ys) �D0s(xt, yt)D0t (xt, yt) × D0s(xs, ys)D0t (xs, ys)�1 2⁄  
                                   (2) 
In equation 2, the ratio outside the square brackets is actually the efficiency 
change (EC), which evaluates the change in the output-oriented measure of Farrell 
technical efficiency between periods s and t. EC = D0t (xt, yt)D0s(xs, ys) 
                                                     (3) 
The remaining part in the equation 2 is the technical change (TC), which 
measures the geometric mean of the shift in technology between the two periods s 
and t.  TC = �D0s(xt, yt)D0t (xt, yt) × D0s(xs, ys)D0t (xs, ys)�1 2⁄  
                                      (4) 
Furthermore, Fare et al (1994) decomposed technical efficiency change into 
"pure" technical efficiency change and scale efficiency change. The pure efficiency 
change (PEC) is defined as (5): PEC = D0vt (xt, yt)D0vs (xs, ys) 
                                              (5) 
And, the scale efficiency change (SEC) is written as: 
  
SEC = �D0vt (xt, yt) D0ct (xt, yt)⁄D0vt (xs, ys) D0ct (xs, ys)⁄ × D0vs (xt, yt) D0cs (xt, yt)⁄D0vs (xs, ys) D0cs (xs, ys)⁄ �1 2⁄  
                 (6) 
The SEC is actually the geometric mean of two SEC measures relative to 
period t and s technology respectively. 
According the Fare et al (1994), the Malmquist TFP index (distance 
measures) in equation 4 can be calculated by using DEA-like linear programming 
methodology. For the firm i-th, four distance functions need to be calculated to 
measure the TFP change between two periods. These four distances can be computed 
by the following four linear programming problems (7-10):  [D0t (xt, yt)]−1 = max∅,λ∅ , 
st  −∅xit + XTλ ≥ 0 , 
    yit − Ytλ ≥ 0 , 
λ ≥ 0 ,  
(7) [D0s(xs, ys)]−1 = max∅,λ∅ , 
st  −∅xis + XSλ ≥ 0 , 
    yis − Ysλ ≥ 0 , 
λ ≥ 0 ,  
(8) [D0t (xs, yt)]−1 = max∅,λ∅ , 
st  −∅xis + XTλ ≥ 0 , 
    yis − Ytλ ≥ 0 , 
    λ ≥ 0 , 
(9) 
and  [D0s(xt, yt)]−1 = max∅,λ∅ , 
st  −∅xit + XSλ ≥ 0 , 
    yit − Ysλ ≥ 0 , 
    λ ≥ 0 ,  
(10) 
where θ is a scalar and λ is a I×l vector of constants. The value of θ is the 
efficiency score for the i-th firm.To calculate the PEC index (equation 5) and the 
SEC index (equation 6), two additional LPs are required on basis of the LPs 7 and 8 
respectively, only with the convexity restriction (Πλ=l) added to each. This study 
adopts DEAP version 2.1 to evaluate the DEA and Malmquist index. The valuable 
instruction of DEAP version 2.1 can refer to Coelli (1996).  
  
Estimation window 
To compare the value of Malmquist TFP index change between prior and 
post-acquisition, three estimation windows are set up in this study, which include 
four time point like one year prior to acquisition (t-1), acquisition announcement 
(t+0), one year after acquisition (t+1) and three years after acquisition ( t+3). The two 
windows (1) from (t-1) to (t+1); and (2) (t-1) to (t+3) represent the short-term 
window and relatively long-term window of M&As respectively.  
EVALUATION RESULT 
Summary statistics  
The information of input and output indicators are summarized in Table 2. On 
the part of input indicators, the equity ratio is increased slightly from 0.36 in t-1 to 
0.38 in t+3. It indicates that the acquirers’ capital commitment increased after 
acquisition. The acquirers’ average inventory turnover decreased significantly from 
0.94 in period t-1 to 0.44 in period t+3. Receivables turnover ratio decreased 
dramatically from 227 to 117 from t-1 to t+1, but then increased slightly to 241 in 
t+3. In terms of out-put indicators, both ROE and ROS increased significantly from 
pre-acquisition to post-acquisition. The acquirer’s average quick ratio has 
experienced little fluctuation from t-1 to t+3. Reversely, cash flow ratio has great 
volatility during the same period. Finally, it has been a substantial rise in the 
acquirers’ return of assets on average from t-1 to t+3. Specially, the short term 
increasing at mean 0.06 is larger than that of long-term at 0.04 on average.  
Productivity measuring result analysis 
Each acquirer’s Malmquist TFP index is provided in Table 3. In terms of 
average value of each acquirer during t-1 to t+3, there are such 17 firms as 1,2,… ,29 
and 32 have TFP growth, while the remaining 15 firms like 4,6,…,28 and 31 have 
experienced productivity decline. Firm 29 is the most productivity growth one with 
TFP index 2.24. According to the above discussion, TFP index of firm 29= TEC* 
TC=1*2.24=2.24., and TEC= PEC * SEC= 1*1=1. Therefore, it can be interpreted 
that the productivity growth of firm 29 are induced by the considerable technical 
improvement after acquisition, while other index like TEC, PEC and SEC with no 
change. Oppositely, the worst performance firm in the productivity decline group is 
goes to firm 8 and 4 with 0.66. Both of two firms have experienced dramatically 
technical efficiency and technology decrease during acquisition. Similarly, the 
remaining firms’ average TFP change index can be understood in the same way. On 
the part of the TFP change index in each period say t+0, t+1 and t+3, it can be seen 
  
from Table 3 that there are 15, 20 and 16 firms experienced TFP progress 
respectively. Obviously, there are 5 more acquirers realized the productivity advance 
in t+1 than that of in t+0. It can be interpreted that most of the acquirers has achieved 
productivity growth through the M&A in short-term, but the growth are reduced in 
the long-term. The each firms of TFP change in these periods can be analyzed by 
using some method as above discussed. Therefore, its growth of productivity is 
mainly promoted by the tremendous improvement of technology and the slight 
increase of technical efficiency. Simultaneously, TEC=PEC*SEC: 1.32=1.12*1.17, 
both of its pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency show some progress.   
Compared comprehensively, regarding to the mean of Malmquist TFP index 
of each period, the TFP have experienced the greatest progress with 1.26 in the year 
of deal making (t+0), but it decreased significantly to 0.81 in the one year after 
acquisition  (t-1). In terms of relative long-term period after acquisition (t+3), the 
acquirers’ mean TFP have slight improvement to1.02. The reason behind of the TFP 
change can be identified from the perspectives of TEC and TC. The acquirers’ 
technology has got the largest upgrade due to the M&A making in t+0, and achieved 
slight increase at t+1, but it suffered a slight decrease in t+3. In contrast, the mean 
technical efficiency of acquirers have marked decline in both t+0 (0.96) and t+1 
(0.79), but get rise in t+3 (1.03). It is reasonable to interpret that the technology of 
acquirers are improved obviously through M&A in short-term due to the more 
commitment of resource, but its growth began to slow down in long-term as the 
effect of M&A on resource investment is weakened. However, the technical 
efficiency has decreased in t+0 and t+1 because of organization transition in 
short-term, but as realization of synergy and integration in long-term, then the 
technical efficiency got increased. Similarly, PEC can be interpreted in the same way 
like the TEC. In surprise, the scale efficiency didn’t realize increase during the M&A 
in either short-term or long-term for developers. That is consistent with the above 
discussed scale efficiency analysis result, the reason behind of which might depends 
on the unique feature of localization and products unmovable in real estate industry.  
CONCLUSION  
This study investigates the efficiency and productivity change of acquirers 
during M&As by using DEA based Malmquist index methods. And then, 32 M&A 
cases from Chinese real estate industry were selected as analysis sample. By 
adopting the DEA based Malmquist TFP change of acquires, the conclusions of 
Malmquist TFP change include: the developers’ TFP realizes growth through M&A; 
Developers’ technology has got increase after acquisition in short-term, but gradually 
reduce in long-term; Their technical efficiency suffer slight drop after M&A in 
short-term, but picked up in long-term; and the scale efficiency of developers didn’t 
realize improvement during M&A in either short-term or long-term. Overall, this 
  
conclusion reflects the characters of real estate industry, and identifies that M&A 
made value-enhancing for developers, but not support the economic scale of M&A in 
real estate industry.  
One point should be mentioned here is that the analysis result of the study 
depends on the specific inputs and outputs selected in this paper. To sum up, the 
analysis method proposed in this study are very useful and valid to measure the 
M&A performance from efficiency and productivity prospective. Valuable and 
reasonable analysis result can be achieved by applying this approach with special 
tailored indicators.  
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APPENDICES  
Table 1 Summary of inputs and outputs indicators 
Input ratios Output ratios 
Equity ratio Return of equity 
Inventory turnover Return on sales 
Receivable Turnover Ratio Quick ratio 
 Cash flow ratio 
 Return of assets 
 Return on sales 
 
Table 2. Summary on the input and output indicators (32 samples) 
Items 
t-1 t+0 t+1 t+3 
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Equity ratio 0.36 -0.79 0.89 0.36 -0.74 0.75 0.39 0.21 0.75 0.38 0.18 0.71 
Inventory 
turnover 
0.94 0.03 6.55 0.67 0.14 3.48 0.49 0.02 2.31 0.44 0 3.76 
Receivables 
turnover Ratio 
227 1 5270 139 4 1990 117 2 1098 241 3 2141 
Return of equity -0.06 -1.5 0.33 0.12 0 0.44 0.12 0 0.55 0.11 -0.02 0.38 
Return on sales 0.23 -0.44 0.51 0.26 0.09 0.44 0.32 0.07 0.71 0.3 0.08 0.56 
Quick ratio 0.69 0.08 2.11 0.58 0.1 1.45 0.72 0.09 2.33 0.68 0.22 1.79 
Cash flow ratio -0.04 -1.37 0.78 0.04 -0.89 1.79 -0.13 -1.19 0.75 -0.1 -0.45 0.45 
Return of assets 0.02 -0.23 0.15 0.06 0 0.36 0.05 0 0.31 0.04 -0.01 0.1 
 










TFP Change (total 
factor productivity) 
t+0 t+1 t+3 Ave. t+0 t+1 t+3 Ave. t+0 t+1 t+3 Ave. t+0 t+1 t+3 Ave. t+0 t+1 t+3 Ave. 
1 0.88 0.75 0.86 0.83  0.97 1.53 1.25 1.23  0.93 0.72 1.06 0.89  0.94 1.04 0.81 0.93  0.85 1.15 1.07 1.01  
2 1.12 0.65 0.73 0.81  0.89 2.52 1.22 1.40  1.10 0.69 0.94 0.89  1.02 0.95 0.78 0.91  1.00 1.65 0.90 1.14  
3 0.62 0.99 1.23 0.91  1.17 1.67 1.20 1.33  1.00 0.81 1.23 1.00  0.62 1.22 1.00 0.91  0.72 1.65 1.47 1.20  
4 1.12 0.50 0.84 0.78  0.81 0.78 0.97 0.85  1.03 0.52 1.13 0.84  1.09 0.97 0.75 0.93  0.91 0.39 0.81 0.66  
5 1.00 0.58 1.35 0.92  0.89 2.31 0.72 1.14  1.00 0.59 1.45 0.95  1.00 0.99 0.94 0.97  0.89 1.34 0.98 1.05  
6 0.72 1.48 1.00 1.02  0.92 1.14 0.58 0.85  0.81 1.28 1.00 1.01  0.89 1.16 1.00 1.01  0.66 1.69 0.58 0.87  
7 0.77 1.30 0.36 0.71  0.87 1.43 0.91 1.04  1.00 1.00 0.82 0.94  0.77 1.30 0.44 0.76  0.67 1.86 0.33 0.74  
8 1.00 1.00 0.59 0.84  1.29 0.64 0.58 0.79  1.00 1.00 0.83 0.94  1.00 1.00 0.71 0.89  1.29 0.64 0.34 0.66  
  
9 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.07 1.13 1.70 1.27  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.07 1.13 1.70 1.27  
10 1.00 0.76 0.64 0.79  1.30 1.13 1.34 1.25  1.00 0.78 0.74 0.83  1.00 0.97 0.87 0.94  1.30 0.85 0.86 0.98  
11 1.20 0.86 0.78 0.93  0.92 1.22 0.93 1.01  1.20 0.87 1.02 1.02  1.00 0.98 0.76 0.91  1.09 1.05 0.72 0.94  
12 1.06 0.84 0.74 0.87  1.13 0.98 1.24 1.11  1.05 0.81 0.98 0.94  1.01 1.03 0.75 0.92  1.19 0.82 0.91 0.96  
13 0.89 0.88 1.29 1.00  0.98 1.75 0.63 1.03  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.89 0.88 1.29 1.00  0.87 1.54 0.82 1.03  
14 1.00 0.64 0.97 0.85  1.81 1.27 1.21 1.41  1.00 0.86 1.17 1.00  1.00 0.75 0.83 0.85  1.81 0.82 1.17 1.20  
15 0.97 0.42 2.44 1.00  0.86 2.47 0.61 1.09  1.00 0.45 2.21 1.00  0.97 0.94 1.10 1.00  0.83 1.04 1.49 1.09  
16 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.95  11.15 0.00 0.58 0.74  1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99  1.00 1.00 0.86 0.95  9.87 0.00 0.49 0.70  
17 1.00 0.70 1.42 1.00  0.70 1.66 1.23 1.13  1.00 0.88 1.14 1.00  1.00 0.80 1.25 1.00  0.70 1.17 1.75 1.13  
18 1.07 0.80 0.84 0.90  0.96 1.38 1.36 1.22  1.07 0.92 0.81 0.93  1.01 0.87 1.04 0.97  1.04 1.11 1.14 1.09  
19 1.12 0.64 0.79 0.83  1.11 1.49 0.93 1.15  1.17 0.80 0.99 0.97  0.96 0.81 0.80 0.85  1.24 0.96 0.74 0.95  
20 1.00 0.98 0.56 0.82  0.86 1.76 1.08 1.18  1.00 1.00 0.68 0.88  1.00 0.98 0.83 0.94  0.86 1.72 0.61 0.97  
21 1.00 0.60 1.67 1.00  0.63 1.30 0.98 0.93  1.00 0.62 1.62 1.00  1.00 0.97 1.03 1.00  0.63 0.78 1.65 0.93  
22 0.73 0.79 1.27 0.90  0.48 1.25 0.90 0.81  1.00 0.66 1.14 0.91  0.73 1.19 1.11 0.99  0.35 0.98 1.15 0.73  
23 1.00 0.91 1.05 0.99  0.88 1.27 1.22 1.11  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 0.91 1.05 0.99  0.88 1.16 1.28 1.09  
24 1.41 0.68 1.20 1.05  0.93 1.34 1.06 1.10  1.35 0.69 1.19 1.04  1.04 0.98 1.01 1.01  1.31 0.91 1.28 1.15  
25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.84 4.22 0.57 1.27  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.84 4.22 0.57 1.27  
26 0.52 1.02 1.75 0.98  0.47 1.88 0.63 0.83  0.82 1.09 1.09 0.99  0.64 0.93 1.60 0.98  0.25 1.91 1.11 0.81  
27 1.01 0.61 2.91 1.21  0.86 1.95 0.49 0.94  1.09 0.88 1.67 1.17  0.92 0.69 1.75 1.03  0.87 1.19 1.43 1.14  
28 1.00 0.62 1.04 0.87  1.16 0.88 1.12 1.05  1.00 0.92 0.89 0.94  1.00 0.68 1.16 0.92  1.16 0.55 1.16 0.91  
29 1.00 0.76 1.32 1.00  1.87 0.83 7.23 2.24  1.00 0.89 1.12 1.00  1.00 0.85 1.17 1.00  1.87 0.63 9.51 2.24  
30 1.17 1.00 1.00 1.05  1.08 1.19 0.94 1.06  1.15 1.00 1.00 1.05  1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.26 1.19 0.94 1.12  
31 0.83 1.01 0.86 0.90  0.98 1.20 1.10 1.09  0.81 1.24 0.85 0.95  1.02 0.82 1.01 0.95  0.81 1.22 0.94 0.98  
32 1.00 0.44 1.55 0.88  1.12 3.05 0.93 1.47  1.00 0.50 1.85 0.97  1.00 0.89 0.84 0.91  1.12 1.34 1.44 1.29  
Mean 0.96 0.79 1.03 0.92 1.31 1.03 0.99 1.10 1.01 0.83 1.07 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 1.26 0.81 1.02 1.01 
Note: If TFP change index is large than 1, it means the firms’ productivity progress, or else, it implies their productivity decline; 
Index in t+0 is based on comparing with t-1, t+1 is based on t+0, and so on; Ave. means the average value of index during t-1 to 
t+3 periods. Mean represents the average value of the entire sample in the same period.  
